ABSTRACT U.S. educational and occupational wage differentials were exceptionally high at the dawn of the twentieth century and then decreased in several stages over the next eight decades. But starting in the early 1980s the labor market premium to skill rose sharply and by 2005 the college wage premium was back at its 1915 level. The twentieth century contains two inequality tales: one declining and one rising. We use a supply-demand-institutions framework to understand the factors that produced these changes from 1890 to 2005. We find that strong secular growth in the relative demand for more educated workers combined with fluctuations in the growth of relative skill supplies go far to explain the long-run evolution of U.S. educational wage differentials. An increase in the rate of growth of the relative supply of skills associated with the high school movement starting around 1910 played a key role in narrowing educational wage differentials from 1915 to 1980. The slowdown in the growth of the relative supply of college workers starting around 1980 was a major reason for the surge in the college wage premium from 1980 to 2005. Institutional factors were important at various junctures, especially during the 1940s and the late 1970s.
Long ago America was deemed the "best poor man's country."
1 Land was plentiful in the early nineteenth century and farming provided ample living standards and fairly uniform incomes. But during the next hundred years the labor force became more diverse. The population urbanized and the economy industrialized. Had we good income data for the period we would surely observe that the income distribution had widened considerably from the early years of the republic to the turn of the twentieth century. But income data for the full distribution are not available until 1940. 2 We do, however, have good data on the wealth distribution that reveals a great widening. 3 By the turn of the twentieth century the distribution of wealth was extremely unequal.
Despite the lack of thick income data for the pre-1940 period, we know a considerable amount about the pecuniary returns to education and the premium that accrued to particular occupations. In the years from around 1890 to 1910 earnings in occupations that required greater levels of schooling were far higher than those that required little education, as shown in Chapter 2. In addition, the economic return around 1915 to a year of high school or college was substantial. The return to education in 1915 greatly exceeded that in 1940 and was sufficiently high that it greatly exceeded returns in subsequent years. Only recently has the college premium approximated its value in 1915. That is, the payoff to a year of further study in 1915 was enormously high. We do not know precisely when in the preceding century the premium to 1 The phrase "the best poor man's country" was initially used in the eighteenth century to describe economic conditions in Pennsylvania but was later used to describe the entire northern part of America. See Lemon (1972, p. 229, fn. 1) who took the title of his book on the early history of southeastern Pennsylvania, The Best Poor Man's Country, from several contemporary comments about the region. The ideas are similar to those in Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1981 America ( , orig. publ. 1832 . 2 See Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006) for data on the incomes of the top 10 percent (or 1 percent) of the distribution from the beginning of the U.S. income tax in 1913 to the early 2000s. 3 James Bryce, in his two volume work The American Commonwealth, remarked that at the time of de Tocqueville "[s] ixty years ago there were no great fortunes in America, few large fortunes, no poverty. Now there is some poverty, many large fortunes, and a greater number of gigantic fortunes than in any other country of the world" (Bryce 1889, p. 600) . Bryce was most certainly correct concerning the general trend in wealth accumulation but he was clearly wrong that poverty was nonexistent in the 1830s. On the trend in the wealth distribution from 1776 to the 1920s (1776, 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1920s ), see Wolff (1995) and the compilation of wealth data in Nasar (New York Times, August 16, 1992) .
schooling increased and whether it was as high even in 1850. But we do know that by 1900 a year of high school or college was an extremely good investment.
The large premium to employment in occupations that had substantial educational requirements around the turn of the twentieth century was observed and commented on by close contemporaries. The economist Paul Douglas, for one, noted that "during the nineties [1890s], the clerical class constituted something of a non-competing group." 4 Douglas's interest in the wage distribution was sparked by a period of great wage compression that was apparent by the early 1920s. The astonishing change that took place in his own time prompted his comment:
"Gradually the former monopolistic advantages are being squeezed out of white-collar work, and eventually there will be no surplus left."
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According to Douglas several factors were acting in concert to compress wages. One was the deskilling of clerical workers through the substitution of office machinery for skill.
Another was the reduction in the flow of immigration, which, to Douglas, led to an increase in the earnings of the less educated. Finally, the supply of educated and trained workers qualified to assume various white-collar positions greatly increased thus depressing their earnings.
Douglas was correct that there were several factors at work, but the relative increase in the supply of skilled and educated personnel was of far greater importance than skill reducing factors on the demand side and also more important than the decrease in immigration, as we shall soon demonstrate. The possibility that deskilling led to the large decrease in the relative earnings of the more educated was laid to rest in Chapter 2 when we showed the similarity of wage changes among clerical occupations. Earnings of white-collar workers in occupations that did not undergo much technical change were reduced almost as much as those that did undergo considerable technical change.
The wage structure began to collapse a short time before 1920 and continued to narrow in various ways until the early 1950s. The earnings of the more educated were reduced relative to 4 Douglas (1930, p. 367, italics added) . 5 Douglas (1926, p. 719) . Paul Douglas was born in 1892 and would have been in his mid-twenties just as the returns to various skills began to be reduced and the wage distribution started to narrow. He was 34 years old when he wrote about the "non-competing" groups that had previously existed.
the less educated. Those employed in skilled occupations saw their earnings increase less than did those in the lower-skilled jobs. For every skilled and professional series we uncovered, the wage structure narrowed relative to wages for a lesser skilled or lower educated group. The series we presented included professors of all ranks, engineers, office and clerical workers, and craft positions in many industries. We also found evidence of a substantial narrowing in the wage distribution of production workers within each of a large group of manufacturing industries. The returns to a year of schooling, not surprisingly, also plummeted from 1915 to the early 1950s. Our estimates of the decrease in the pecuniary returns to a year of education are robust to the level of schooling and also to the age and sex of the individuals. The returns to schooling were so high prior to the narrowing that even after the initial decline, the returns to education remained substantial.
Our point is that inequality and the pecuniary returns to education were both exceptionally high around the turn of the twentieth century. But America remained the destination of choice for the world's people, and immigration was at record high levels just before the 1920s when Congressional legislation severely reduced the flow. 6 It was still the "best poor man's country," but the moniker was no longer used because America had a narrow income distribution. To the contrary, America's income distribution was probably far wider than it had ever been. The description was still applicable because America had a considerably higher average income than did other nations. More important was the fact that the United States was a society with fairly open educational access and had more equality of opportunity than existed in Europe. Certain groups, in particular African Americans living in the U.S. South, remained left out for some time. But even they gained access to improved schooling during the mid-twentieth century and moved into higher paying jobs in the 1960s.
Integrating the two tales of the twentieth century
By the early 1970s one could say that America "had it all." The U.S. economy had grown at a record pace in the 1960s when labor productivity expanded at 2.75 percent average 6 On U.S. immigration restriction, see Goldin (1994) .
annually. 7 The wage structure widened only slightly from the late 1940s and the income distribution had remained relatively stable. Each generation of Americans achieved a level of education greater than the preceding one, meaning that the average adult had considerably more education than its parents. The nation's economy was strong. Its people were sharing relatively equally in its prosperity regardless of their position in the income distribution. Racial and regional differences in educational resources, educational attainment, and economic outcomes had narrowed substantially since the early twentieth century. 8 Upward mobility with regard to education characterized American society.
Had we continued to grow at the rate we did from the end of World War II to the mid1970s and had inequality remained at the level it had attained by the early 1950s, this volume would tell a rather different story. But the American economy did not stay the course.
Inequality soared from the late-1970s to the early 2000s. Productivity, moreover, did not continue to advance at the rate it once had. It slowed considerably beginning in the mid-1970s
and it remained low for about two decades. Although productivity growth eventually resumed its previous rate, rising inequality magnified the impact of the sluggish economy on the vast majority of Americans.
The full twentieth century contains two inequality tales-one declining and one rising.
These tales can be seen in the almost century-long view of key components of wage inequality in Figure 1 , which shows the college graduate wage premium (relative to those who stopped at high school) and the high school graduate wage premium (relative to those who left school at eighth grade) from 1915 to 2005. 7 Growth is given by productivity trends using output per hour in the non-farm business sector from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (series PRS85006093 from http://www.bls.gov/lpc/home.htm). 8 The black-white schooling completion gap narrowed from 3.84 years for those born in 1885 (25 years old in 1910) to 1.35 years for those born in 1945 (25 years old in 1970), based on tabulations from the 1940 and 1970 IPUMS. The cross-state standard deviation of mean years of schooling narrowed from 1.60 years for those born in 1885 to 0.62 years for those born in 1945. On the evolution of racial and regional differences in school resources, see Card and Krueger (1992a, 1992b) ; on regional income convergence, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) ; and on racial income convergence, see Donohue and Heckman (1991) .
The college wage premium shows a sharp decline from 1915 to 1950, jaggedness from 1950 to 1980, and a rapid increase after 1980. At century's end the premium to college graduation was about the same as at century's beginning. The wage premium for high school graduates shows an equally sharp decrease in the pre-1950 era but less of an increase during the rest of the century. We will discuss why interest should center on the college premium for most of the century and the high school premium for only the first half. The premium to education, therefore, came full circle in the twentieth century and by 2005 had returned to its high water mark at the beginning of the high school movement in 1915.
We will now complete the task we began in Chapter 3 and decompose the change in relative wages by education for the 1915 to 2005 period into its sources. Why did education returns fall in the first half of the twentieth century but rise at the end of the second half? One factor that is common to both parts of the century is technological change that increased demand for skilled and educated workers. But vicissitudes in the rate of growth in the supply of educated labor, we will soon demonstrate, played a key role in altering inequality trends. The race between technological change and education resulted in economic expansion and also determined who received the fruits of growth.
Several empirical and conceptual problems arise in integrating the inequality facts from the early part of the twentieth century with those from the latter part. Although we have good data on income and wages by education since 1940, we know far less about the period before 1940. We have already mentioned our exceptional data for 1915 Iowa on earnings by education and we use them in the construction of Figure 1 . Thus the returns to education, but not the full distribution of income, can be analyzed in a consistent manner for the entire period from 1915 to 2005. The returns to education and other components of wage inequality do not always move in lock step, but we do know that in recent decades the lion's share of rising wage inequality can be traced to an increase in educational wage differentials. 9 A conceptual issue we will face is that although we have a reasonably good understanding of what a more-educated worker is today, we must decide on a standard for the more distant past. We will discuss how we surmount these hurdles and offer a fuller analysis of inequality trends in the twentieth century.
B. The Supply, Demand, and Institutions (SDI) Framework
The framework we employ to decompose the impact of various factors influencing the returns to education is an extension of that introduced in Chapter 3. The two most important forces in the framework concern the change in the relative supply of more-educated workers, which has mainly occurred through changes in schooling, and the change in the relative demand for more-educated workers, which has been driven by skill-biased technological change. We also incorporate institutional factors, such as changes in union strength and the effects of wartime wage-setting policies. In this sense we combine the usual supply and demand framework with institutional rigidities and alterations. As we will see, the broader framework is most We construct a formal supply-demand framework that will guide the empirical analysis of the factors that altered the returns to education during the past century. The framework rests on the central finding in Chapter 3 that skill-biased technical change advanced rapidly throughout the twentieth century and thus that the relative demand for skill increased at a fairly steady rate. Our approach will be to determine how much of the evolution in educational wage differentials we can explain by fluctuations in the growth rate in the supply of skills combined with smooth trends in relative demand growth. We will then search for institutional factors that can reconcile patterns in the skill premium that are not well explained by our simple supplydemand framework.
We use a labor demand framework where the aggregate production function depends only on the quantities of skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled (S) workers are defined as those with some college and the unskilled (U) are those without any college. The aggregate production
The Race between Education and Technology 6 function is assumed to be CES (constant elasticity of substitution) in skilled and unskilled labor with an aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor given byσ SU .
Unskilled labor itself is assumed to be a CES sub-aggregate that depends on the number of high school graduates (H) and those without a high school diploma (O), also called "dropouts," with an elasticity of substitution ofσ HO .
The framework can be summarized by the following two equations:
where eq. (1) is the aggregate production function and eq. (2) is the sub-aggregate for unskilled labor. In eq. (1) Q is output, A is total factor productivity, S is units of skilled or college labor, and U is units of unskilled or non-college labor. In eq. (2) H is units of high school graduate labor and O is units of high school dropout labor. The parameters λ t and θ t give the shares of the different types of labor and will be modeled as technology shift parameters. 10 The CES parameters ρ and η are related to the elasticities of substitution, such that σ Wages for the three skill groups of workers (S, H, O) are derived using the familiar condition that a competitive equilibrium occurs when wages equal marginal products. Relative wages for college to high school workers and for high school graduates to dropouts are given by:
and log log log
Thus, relative wages depend on the demand shifters (λ t and θ t ), the relative supply of the more and less educated groups, and the relevant elasticity of substitution between the two groups (σ SU andσ HO ). The framework is constructed so that changes in the relative supply of college to noncollege labor do not affect the premium to high school graduates relative to high school dropouts.
The restriction does not imply that college supplies are unimportant for the wages of the unskilled, but it does mean that the supply of the more educated labor equally affects the wages of the high school graduates and the dropouts. Another key assumption of the framework is that relative skill supplies are taken as predetermined and thus that, in the short run, labor supply for each skill group is inelastic. We apply the framework first to changes in the college wage premium. The facts that need to be explained and reconciled are easily summarized and are given in Table 1 (see also Because the premium to education at the end of the century was approximately equal to its level at the start, our supply-demand framework implies that the relative demand for skill across the entire century must have grown at about the same rate as the relative supply of skill.
The relative supply of college workers (Table 1, col. 2) grew rapidly for much of the period, although a slowdown of critical importance is apparent toward the end. For the full period, growth in relative supply was at a fairly rapid clip-on the order of 2.87 percent per annum.
Even though the race between technology and education over the long run was about even, the long run hides crucial short run changes. What changed across the past century that caused the returns to education to decline and then rise?
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We will soon see that fluctuations in the supply of college workers, relative to other workers, together with stable demand growth can explain the shorter-run movements in the college premium to a substantial degree. We obtain that result when we estimate a version of eq.
(3) across the 1915 to 2005 period using data for all the available years : 1915, 1940, 1950, 1960, and annually from 1963 to 2005. 11 The dependent variable is the wage premium of those with at least a college degree (16 or more years of schooling) to those with exactly a high school degree (12 years of schooling). The relative skill supply measure is the supply of college equivalents (those with a college degree plus half of those with some college) to high school equivalents (those with 12 or fewer years of schooling plus half of those with some college). 12 Our empirical specification includes a linear time trend to allow for secular growth in the relative demand for college workers and interactions with specific years to allow for changes in the demand trend. In most of the specifications we add a term to allow the demand trend to change with 1992, following our earlier findings in Chapter 3 concerning a slowdown in demand growth beginning in the early 1990s. 13 The results are provided in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 2 .
The most important result from the analysis is that changes in the relative supply of college workers had a substantial and significant negative impact on the college wage premium across the entire period. Most of the specifications yield similar coefficients for the relative supply variable (Table 2 , line 1). That for col. (3), our preferred specification, implies that a 10 percent increase in the relative supply of college equivalents reduces the college wage premium by 6.1 percent and translates into an elasticity of substitution between the skilled and unskilled,σ SU , of 1.64 (= 1/0.61, see eq. 3). The rapid growth of the supply of college equivalents from 1915 to 1980 operated to depress the college wage premium despite strong 11 The wage and skill supply data are actually for the years 1914, 1939, 1949, and 1959 but for simplicity of presentation we will refer to these dates as 1915, 1940, 1950, and 1960 , which are the years of the censuses (state and federal) from which these data were collected. See Acemoglu (2002) for a related time series analysis of the college wage premium and the relative supply of college skills using data for 1939 to 1996 (1939, 1949, 1959, and 1963 to 1996) . 12 Our empirical specification and measurement choices follow Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a) . The empirical findings are similar for alternative measures of the skilled-unskilled wage premium, such as a fixed-weighted average of wages of all workers with some college or more to all workers with no college. The basic results are also robust to the use of different relative supply measures (such as workers with any college versus those with no college) and to adding controls for cyclical factors (such as the unemployment rate). 13 See also Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a) . secular growth in the relative demand for college equivalents. The sharp slowdown in the growth in the supply of college workers since 1980 has been a driving force in the rise in the college wage premium.
Overall, simple supply and demand specifications do a remarkable job explaining the long-run evolution of the college wage premium. The predictions from specifications (2) 14 The decrease in the college wage premium of the 1940s, it appears, overshot changes in the fundamentals and the increase of the 1950s, in consequence, brought the system back into 14 See Goldin and Margo (1992) for a detailed analysis of these factors in the 1940s wage compression.
sync. We explore that possibility by including a dummy variable for 1949 to allow temporary institutional factors to impact wage setting in the 1940s (Table 2 , col. 3). The estimation implies that institutional factors, or temporary demand factors, lowered the college wage premium by 14 log points in 1949. As shown in Figure 2 , the col. (3) predictions fit the data extremely well and that is our preferred specification. The flexible time trend given by the col. (4) specification demonstrates the robustness of the coefficient on relative labor supply across the entire period.
Another briefer period that is not captured well by the specifications in Table 2 is the decline in the college wage premium in the mid to late 1970s. The period was complicated by the post-1973 productivity slowdown and severe oil price and inflation shocks. Many unions, such as in steel and automobiles, whose members were disproportionately in the non-college group, had wage contracts that were fully indexed to inflation and geared to provide real wage increases that tracked expected national productivity growth. Because union settlements in the late 1970s
had not yet adjusted to slower productivity growth, they produced a relative increase in the wages of the non-college workers. But the deep recession of the early 1980s and changes in employer attitudes towards unions, particularly following Reagan's stand-off with air traffic controllers, led to concession bargaining in the early 1980s and set the stage for the spectacular rebound of the college wage premium.
Thus various institutional factors may have led to a larger decline of the college wage premium in the 1970s than warranted by the supply and demand fundamentals and, in consequence, to a catch-up increase in the early 1980s. The continued decline of unions and the erosion of the real value of the federal minimum wage in the 1980s may have increased the college wage premium by more than was justified by market factors alone.
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Demand growth for college workers appears to have slowed in the1990s, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the trend interacted with 1992. Given the rapid spread of information technology and work-place reorganization in the 1990s and beyond, this finding would appear to be at odds with the skill-biased technological change explanation. But a resolution exists. As 15 On union wage developments in the 1970s and early 1980s see Mitchell (1980 Mitchell ( , 1985 . On the role of institutions in the growth of wage inequality in the 1980s see DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) . the college educated group became a larger share of the labor force, it also became more heterogeneous. Demand for those who graduated from more selective institutions as well as those with post-B.A. degrees is still soaring and they are doing spectacularly well. But demand for the remaining group is less strong and they are not doing as well.
b. Computing supply and demand shifts
To understand more about the race between technological change and education we use the estimated coefficients on college relative supply to compute changes in relative demand across the entire period and for various sub-periods. The estimates are given in the last three columns of Table 1 for three values ofσ SU : 1.4 (a consensus estimate from the past literature that we used in Chapter 3); 1.64 (our preferred estimate from col. 3 of 16 Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) discuss the "polarization" of the U.S. labor market since 1990, by which they mean that the two end of the distribution are doing better than the middle. The top is doing well, the middle is doing poorly, and the bottom is doing fairly well. Their explanation is that demand is soaring for those who have both technical and "people" skills and is strong, as well, for those who have lower-skilled jobs in the service sector. Computers substitute for routine manual and cognitive tasks, thus reducing demand for many college workers. But new information technologies complement the nonroutine analytic and interactive tasks of those with post-college training and have relatively little impact on non-routine manual tasks of many lower-skilled service sector jobs. The growth of international outsourcing (also known as off-shoring) appears to have had similar impacts on labor demand. See also Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Levy and Murnane (2004) . 17 The 1970s contain similarities to the 1940s, as we noted in the text, in the overshooting of the reduction in the college wage premium due to institutional factors. Thus the 1950s and the 1980s contain similar increases in the college wage premium to offset the change. 18 We use the entire 1940 to 1960 period rather than the two sub-decades for the reasons provided in the text. The college wage premium in the 1940s, in would appear, decreased more than justified by fundamentals and the increase in the 1950s brought it back to its equilibrium value.
The slowdown in the growth of educational attainment since 1980 is the most important factor in the rising college wage premium of the post-1980 period. Had the relative supply of college workers from 1980 to 2005 expanded at the rate it did from 1960 to 1980 (3.77 percent per annum rather than 2 percent per annum), the relative wage of college workers would have fallen rather than have increased, as it did at 0.9 percent per annum.
To be sure, relative demand growth for college workers was more rapid in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly in the 1980s, than the first half. But demand growth has not been particularly rapid since 1990. 19 Technology has been racing ahead of education in recent decades but the primary reason is that educational growth has been sluggish. We summarized the point in Chapter 3 with the quip "it's not technology -stupid." We will soon demonstrate that the inequality culprit is also "not immigration."
College workers were not the only well-educated group of the first-half of the twentieth century and were not the most important quantitatively. We now turn to an understanding of movements in the high school wage premium. A high school diploma was the mark of a welleducated individual in the early part of the twentieth century just as a college diploma has been from the mid-point onward.
2. High school wage premium a. Applying the framework
To understand changes in the high school wage premium we assume, as we did in the formal statement of the framework, that those without any college can be grouped together and are a composite of high school graduates and those who did not graduate from high school (called "dropouts"). We compare those with exactly 12 years of schooling to those with fewer than 12 years. 19 The rapid implied growth of the relative demand for college workers from 1980 to 1990 in Table 1 may have been produced by actual demand acceleration from the computer revolution as well as an overshooting from institutional factors (declines in both union strength and the real minimum wage).
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The high school wage premium changed in a manner similar to that of the college premium in the first half of the period (Figure 1 and Table 3) . 20 The high school wage premium collapsed from 1915 to 1950, as did the college wage premium. But the high school wage premium then remained quite flat from 1950 to 1980 whereas the college wage premium evolved with more jaggedness. The big difference in the two series begins after 1980. The increase for the high school wage premium is anemic in comparison with that for the college wage premium.
Rather than coming full circle, as was the case for the college wage premium, the high school wage premium was far lower at the end of the twentieth century than in 1915.
The primary reason for the collapse of the high school wage premium in the 1915 to 1950
period, we will show, was the enormous growth in the relative supply of high school graduates ever since the high school movement was set in motion. Compared with dropouts, the supply of high school graduates increased at 4.25 percent average annually for the full period from 1915 to 2005 and at 5.54 percent average annually during the high school movement years, 1915 to 1940 (see Table 3 ). The only years of marked slowness in the relative supply of high school graduates are those in the most recent period, 1990 to 2005.
High school graduates and dropouts are today considered close substitutes in the labor market. But during much of the twentieth century they were not. High school graduates were distinctly more skilled and many positions were reserved for them. Thus the vast increase in high school graduation throughout much of the twentieth century served to reduce the high school wage premium by increasing the relative supply of high school graduates to dropouts.
To obtain estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high school graduates and dropouts (σ HO ) and to explore the role of institutional factors, we perform a time-series analysis 20 We focus on the evolution of the wage differential between those with exactly a high school degree (12 years of schooling) and those with 8 years of schooling. Those margins are the most relevant ones for measuring the full returns to high school in the first-half of the century since the majority of workers had 8 or fewer years of schooling in 1915. In contrast, almost no U.S. born workers today have less than 9 years of schooling (under 1 percent in 2005) and the more meaningful margin is the earnings gap between those with a high school degree and high school dropouts (those with 9 to 11 years of schooling). Empirically, the distinction does not matter much for the time series path of the high school wage premium or for our analytic conclusions. These two measures of the high school wage premium are compared in Appendix Table A8 .1.
of the high school wage premium similar to that for the college wage premium and estimate a version of eq. (4). The setup for the high school wage premium is similar to that for the college premium, and the details of the regressions are given in Table 4 . In the case of college equivalents versus other workers, the elasticity of substitution (σ SU ) was extremely stable throughout the period. But, in the case of high school graduates versus dropouts, the elasticity of substitution (σ HO ) shifted substantially around 1950. The shift can be seen by adding an interaction between the relative supply term and a dummy variable for the post-1949 period (Table 4 , col. 4). In the absence of the interaction the elasticity of substitution is substantial in magnitude (around 5) for the entire period. But the interaction shows that the elasticity of substitution is high only in the post-1949 period and is low (around 2) in the previous years. The large and significant coefficient on the interaction should be contrasted with that for the college wage premium for which there is virtually no impact of adding a similar term (Table 2 , col. 5).
The point we are making is that before around 1950 the elasticity of substitution between high school graduates and dropouts was low (around 2), but after 1950 it was high (about 5).
High school graduates and dropouts are close substitutes today but were less substitutable prior to the 1950s. Changes in relative supply of high school graduates to dropouts today will have smaller effects on the high school wage premium than in the past.
These findings accord well with the discussion in previous chapters about the reasons for the high school movement. Earlier in the century firms sought high school graduates as office workers and also as blue-collar production workers in many of the high-tech industries of the day. Those hiring employees described certain jobs as requiring a high school diploma or particular high school courses and they viewed high school graduates as vastly superior to those without secondary school training. But today's high school graduates and dropouts are perceived as far closer substitutes. In fact, the specifications in Table 4 that do not allow for a break in the elasticity of substitution in 1949 (cols. 1, 2, and 3) give the implausible result that there was essentially no trend increase in the demand for high school graduates relative to dropouts during the pre-1950 period. The historical facts and our estimates speak to a change in the distinction between a worker with a high school degree and one who is a high school dropout.
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As in the case of the college premium, there is an appearance of some overshooting of the high school premium in the 1940s and a catch-up in the 1950s. But institutional factors appear far less important in the case of the lower-educated group than they were for the college wage premium. The 1949 year dummy, for example, is insignificant in the high school wage premium regression (Table 4 , col. 3).
b. Computing supply and demand shifts
We use three values of the elasticity of substitution (2, 3, and 5) that span our estimates to compute demand shifts and to calculate the relative impact of supply and demand in changing the high school wage premium (see Table 3 ). As opposed to the case of the college wage premium, our preferred estimate of the elasticity of substitution varies over time. We prefer an elasticity of substitution of 2 for the pre-1950s and 5 for the post-1950s.
The central finding is that the decrease in the high school wage premium from 1915 to 1940 was due mainly to the rapid growth in relative supply. By the calculations in Table 3 The question we ask is how much of the change in skill supplies that we detailed in the previous sections came from changes in immigration and how much was due to changes in the education of the native-born population. The presumption of many observers of both the earlier and the later periods has been that immigration greatly impacted the premium to skill. We directly confront the effect of immigrants on relative skill supplies and on the premium to skill.
Our answer will be that immigration had a far smaller effect on relative skill supplies in all periods we examine than is generally presumed and thus it had a smaller impact on changes in the premium to education than is often asserted. 
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Early in the twentieth century, according to For much of the post-World War II period, the foreign born remained a small fraction of the workforce and were fairly balanced relative to the native-born with regard to education. The foreign born, in other words, increased the less-educated group about as much as they increased the more-educated group and they did not have a large impact on any of the groups. For the most recent years, however, immigrants have had a much larger impact on skill supplies. In 1990 they increased the number of dropouts by 29 percent, but they increased the number of high school graduates by just 7.5 percent. In 2005 they increased the number of dropouts by an astounding 76 percent and increased the supply of high school graduates by almost 15 percent.
The increase in the immigrant share for high school and college equivalents are substantial, but the two have tended to be fairly balanced.
b. Immigration and the skill gap
The contribution of immigrants to the skill gap is summarized in Table 5 by a construct called the "log gap." 24 The "log gap" gives the fraction of the log difference between the supplies of the unskilled and skilled group (e.g., high school dropouts to high school graduates) accounted for by the presence of immigrants. 25 The fraction is 14.4 percent in 1915, decreases to 1970 when it was 2.9 percent, and then increases for the remainder of the period. In 2005 immigrants expanded the dropout to high school graduate ratio by 43 percent (log points). On the other hand, the immigrant contribution to the ratio of high school to college equivalents is modest in all years and is greatest for 1915. Given the contribution of immigration to the level 23 The immigrant employment share in 1915 Iowa was 15.6 percent (Table 5 ) but around 21 percent for the entire United States. Information on educational attainment in the U.S. population census does not exist until 1940. The data on educational attainment in 1940 of older immigrant birth cohorts (those who arrived by 1915) and the U.S. born in the same cohorts confirms that the contribution of immigration to skill supply gaps for the United States in 1915 is well-approximated by our direct estimates for Iowa. 24 The "log gap" term is borrowed from Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) . 25 The derivation of the "log gap" is provided in the notes to Table 5. of the skill supply gap it would appear that immigration would have been particularly important at the lower end during the early and late sub-periods.
We previously saw that there was a large slowdown in the growth of the relative supply of the college educated in the post-1980s and that slowdown accounted for much of the increase in the college wage premium. But how much of the slowdown in skill supplies was due to the increase in immigration? The answer is that not much was due to immigration and the details are contained in Table 6 . Just 14 percent of the supply slowdown was due to the increase in the Our point is that immigration had but a minor impact on the growth in the relative supply of the college educated and a moderate effect on the supply of high school graduate workers relative to dropouts for the 1980 to 2005 period. Consequently immigration played only a modest role in the surge in the skill premium during those years. Immigration decreased the 26 The slowdown in the U.S. high school graduation rate will be discussed in Chapter 9.
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Using our preferred estimate of σ SU (1.64), the change in relative supply implies an increase in the college wage premium of 2.4 log points or only about 10 percent of the overall increase, a statement we made earlier.
In contrast to the impact of immigration, the slowdown in the growth rate of the relative supply of college-equivalents among the native born was of monumental importance in increasing the college wage premium after 1980. The slowdown of 1.4 percent (log points) per year from the 1960-80 to the 1980-2005 periods decreased the overall relative supply of college equivalents by 34.9 log points and led to a 21.3 log point increase in the college wage premium.
Thus, the slowdown in the growth of relative college supply from the native-born was nine times more important than was new immigration in the rise of the college wage premium from 1980 to
2005. An analogous calculation implies that the slowdown in the relative supply of high school graduates to dropouts among U.S. natives had a larger impact than the surge in low-skilled immigration in contributing to the widening of the high school wage premium since 1980.
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We turn now to the early part of the twentieth century when immigrants were a large fraction of the U.S. labor force and were far less educated than native-born Americans. Even though the sharp reduction in immigration starting in the 1910s increased the relative supply of educated workers, the increased schooling of the native-born was by far the stronger factor in the rapid relative growth of skill supplies and thus the decrease in the skill premium.
The reason for the greater impact of educational advance of the U.S. born than immigration in the 1915 to 1940 period is contained in Table 6 . Of the 4.8 percent annual growth in the relative supply of high school graduates to dropouts from 1915 to 1940, 4.41 percent per year was from the increased educational attainment of the native-born and just 0.39 percent per year was from the decline in immigration. Therefore, the curtailment of immigration 27 Our implicit assumption that immigrants and the native-born are perfect substitutes within education groups may slightly overstate the impact of immigration on the wages of the U.S. born. Estimates of the wage impacts of immigration also tend to be smaller in local labor market analyses than in our approach of looking at skill supplies at the national level. See Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) , Borjas (2003) , Card (2005) , and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) The measure of skill returns that we will use is one that we introduced in Chapter 2-the ratio of the wage in an occupation that required some secondary school or higher to the wage in an occupation that did not. We can more finely track the movement of occupational wage ratios prior to 1930 than the returns to education. We showed in Chapter 2 that the premium to various types of office and professional work declined starting around 1914 to the early 1920s. Although the ratio for some of the series increased a bit at the end of the 1920s, the wage premium for white collar work never returned to the levels that existed before 1914. We ask what factors were responsible for the high levels of the premium to skill and education in the period of noncompeting groups and for the sharp and persistent decrease after 1914.
To understand what caused the skill premium to decrease, we must provide estimates of the change in wage ratios by skill and also in the supplies of educated workers. force participation rate for male high school graduates was the same as the overall male labor force participation rate and that it was 40 percent higher for female high school graduates than for females without a high school degree. We then compare these figures to the overall adult labor force data from the U.S. population census.
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The implied estimates from administrative data of the high school graduate share of the U.S. labor force are displayed in col.
(1) of Table 7 . The stock of high school graduates in the United States increased very slowly to 1910, when they were 5.4 percent of the U.S. labor force.
But after 1910 the stock increased at a much faster clip. None of these changes should be surprising given the advances of the high school movement during the post-1910 period. From 1890 to 1910 the change in the relative supply of high school graduates to those with less than a high school degree in the labor force was 31.5 log points and from 1910 to 1930 it was 89.9 log points, almost three times as large. These data translate into a 1.57 percent per year average annual increase in the relative supply of high school graduates during the first period and 4.49 percent per year increase during the second. An alternative approach to estimating the high 28 We use the following four groups to measure the white collar wage premium with the 1910-30 change in the log wage premium and the weight for each group given in parentheses: male clerks (-0.379, 0.3), female clerks (-0.229, 0.2), associate professors (-0.247, 0.25) , and starting engineers (-0.143, 0.25) . The rationale for the weights is that white-collar work was about 50 percent clerical at the time and males were about 60 percent of clerical workers. See Goldin and Katz (1995, tables 1 and 10) . 29 See Goldin and Katz (1995, 2. Explaining the skill premium decline: education, immigration, and demand Douglas had suggested several possible factors that could account for the decrease in the skill premium: a relative increase in educated workers; a decrease in immigration (thus fewer less-educated workers); and a decrease in the relative demand for skill due to the "deskilling" of various office positions. We assess each of these explanations using our aggregate measure of the change in the skill premium, changes in the stock of educated workers including immigrants, and our estimate of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers,σ SU (which implies that the wage elasticity of demand for skill = − 1 σ SU ).
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Because there was no change in the premium to skill from 1890 to 1910, relative supply and demand must have been changing at the same rate. The relative supply of high school graduates increased by 31.5 log points during those decades (using the administrative data estimates in col. 1 of Table 7 ) and thus demand must have increased by the same rate. But during the next period, from 1910 to 1930, the premium to skill decreased by 25.7 log points.
Given our preferred estimate of σ SU = 1.64, the acceleration in relative supply growth of 58.4
30 The census-based estimates of the high school graduate share in col. (2) of Table 7 are much higher than the administrative-based estimates in every year from 1890 to 1930. See Goldin (1998) on the overstatement of high school graduation rates of older cohorts in the 1940 census. 31 Recall that the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, − 1 σ SU , is ( The calculation assumes that demand continues to increase at its previous rate (31.5 log points) but that relative supply shifts out by 58.4 log points. Relative wages, therefore, would have to fall by 35.6 log points (= 58.4 × -0.61, the relative wage elasticity). 33 If relative wages decreased by 25.7 log points rather than by 35.6 points, then demand had to accelerate by the difference divided by the relative wage elasticity, which is approximately 16.3 log points. 34 Using our census-based estimates of the labor force share of high school graduates (from col. 2 of Table  7) , we find that immigration accounts for a 0.9 percentage point increase in the high school graduate share
The increase in the education of native-born workers from 1910 to 1930 was so great that even had immigration remained at its 1910 level during those two decades, the relative supply of educated workers would have increased by 85.2 log points as compared with its actual increase of 89.9 log points from 1910 to 1930. Thus, schooling gains among the U.S. born were more than eleven times larger than immigration in the faster skill supply growth after 1910 and consequently for the collapse in the white collar wage premium from 1910 to 1930. Technological change is the engine of economic growth. Yet, it also has a potentially dark side. We do not mean pollution, crowding, and other disamenities. Rather we mean that technological change creates winners and losers and can sometimes have adverse distributional consequences that may foment social tension. Such distributional problems are more likely when technological change is skill biased, that is when new technologies increase the relative demand for more skilled and more advantaged workers.
A nation's economy will grow more as technology advances, but the earnings of some may advance considerably more than the earnings of others. If workers have flexible skills and if the educational infrastructure expands sufficiently, then the supply of skills will increase as demand increases for them. Growth and the premium to skill will be balanced and the race between technology and education will not be won by either side and prosperity will be widely shared. External factors can also alter the demand and the supply of skills. The immigration of workers who are disproportionately at the bottom of the skill distribution could greatly impact the earnings of those who are their closest substitutes. Globalization factors affecting international trade patterns and off-shoring opportunities can also alter skill demands.
of the labor force from 1910 to 1930 as compared with a 10.1 percentage point contribution from the U.S. born. 35 More precisely, the growth in the relative supply of high school graduates increased by 58.4 log points from 31.5 log points for 1890-1910 to 89.9 log points for 1910-30. The rising high school graduation rate of the U.S. born accounts for 53.7 log points of this acceleration and declining immigration explains the remaining 4.7 log points.
In this chapter, we have summarized the estimates we presented in Chapter 2 on the returns to skill and education. The premium to skill first decreased from its very high level in the late nineteenth century. By the 1960s America was growing rapidly and the fruits of economic growth were being shared fairly equally across the income scale. But the story quickly and abruptly changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s when rapidly rising inequality took hold and productivity growth was sluggish at best. The twentieth century, then, contains two inequality stories. What can explain why that has been the case?
In search of an explanation, we have used our estimates of relative skill supplies provided in Chapter 1 to uncover why the relative premium to skill changed. We did so by estimating the elasticity of substitution between various groups of workers by skill or education. We then used these estimates to compute the degree to which relative labor demand and supply shifted.
The supply and demand framework we employed does an extremely good job in explaining changes in the premium to skill. There are times in the analysis when we have appealed to institutional changes and rigidities. But, by and large, the framework allows us to tell a consistent and coherent story to reconcile the two inequality tales of the twentieth century.
We will summarize the major findings of that analysis and begin with the college wage premium.
Over the very long run, from 1915 to 2005, the college wage premium has remained the same. Thus, over the very long run supplies and demands for relative skill were balanced. But that does not help us understand the two tales. Only a detailed analysis of the sub-periods will. We questioned whether some of the supply changes we measured were really due to changes in immigration rather than to education. The issue is most important for the earliest of the periods we studied, when immigration was high and then restricted, and also for the most recent period, when immigration surged again.
We noted that during the critical period 1980 to 2005, when the college premium increased by an astonishing 23 percent, immigration could account for only 10 percent of the surge or just 2.4 log points. Most of the increase was due, instead, to the slowdown in college going among the native-born population. In fact, educational changes to the native-born population were nine times more important than was immigration for the rise in the college wage premium.
Immigration was more important for the relative decline at the bottom end of the skill distribution. But even in that calculation, educational slowdowns among the U.S. born were more important quantitatively.
Earlier in the century, the high school movement was considerably more important than immigration restrictions to the reduction in the skill premium. Had immigration remained at its high early twentieth century level but the high school movement had occurred as it did, the relative supply of educated workers would have grown at 95 percent of its actual rate (85.2 versus 89.9 log points) from 1910 to 1930.
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We noted that the wage structure and the returns to skill have exhibited important discontinuities. Most of the narrowing in wage differentials, for example, took place in the 1910s and the 1940s, periods close to or coinciding with the two world wars. They were times of increased demand for the lower skilled, great innovation, and union activity. But although the discontinuities in the wage structure suggest a structural change, the fact that the wage structure remained in place though the institutions changed suggests the importance of fundamental changes in both education and technology.
Our central conclusion is that when it comes to changes in the wage structure and returns to skill, supply changes are critical, and education changes are by far the most important on the supply side. The fact was true in the early years of our period when the high school movement made Americans educated workers and in the post-World War II decades when high school graduates became college graduates. But the same is also true today when the slowdown in education at various levels is robbing America of the ability to grow strong together. We now address what it takes to win the race for the long run.
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Sources and Notes:
The actual values for the college wage premium are from the series used in the regressions in Table 2 and documented in the notes to Table 2 . The two series for the predicted college wage premium are the values of the college wage premium predicted from the regressions in col. (2) and col. (3) of Table 2 , as noted in the figure. 
Notes:
The "relative wage" is the log (college/high school) wage differential, which is the college wage premium. The underlying college wage premium series is plotted in Figure 1 . The relative supply and demand measures are for college "equivalents" (college graduates plus half of those with some college) relative to high school "equivalents" (those with 12 or fewer years of schooling and half of those with some college). The log relative supply measure is given by the log relative wage bill share of college equivalents minus the log relative wage series:
where S is efficiency units of employed skilled labor (college equivalents), U is efficiency units of employed unskilled labor (high school equivalents), and and are the (compositionadjusted) wages of skilled and unskilled labor. The log relative wage bill is based on the series for the wage bill share of college equivalents in Appendix Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) for details on the methodology for measuring relative skill supply and demand changes. Sources and Notes: Each column is an OLS regression of the college wage premium on the indicated variables using a sample covering the years 1914, 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1963 to 2005 . Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. The college wage premium is a fixed weighted average of the estimated college (exactly 16 years of schooling) and post-college (17+ years of schooling) wage differential relative to high school graduates (those with exactly 12 years of schooling). (College/high school) supply is the log supply of college equivalents to high school equivalents both measured in efficiency units. The data for 1963 to 2005 are from the 1964 to 2006 March CPS samples. The college wage premium and relative supplies in efficiency units for 1963 to 2005 use the same data processing steps and sample selection rules as those described in the data appendix to Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2007) . The college wage premium for 1963 to 2005 uses the log weekly earnings of full-time, full-year workers. The college wage premium observations for 1914, 1939, 1949, and 1959 append the changes in the college wage premium series from 1915 to 1970 (actually 1914 to 1969) plotted in Figure 1 to the 1969 data point from our March CPS series. The log relative supply observations for 1914 to 1959 similarly append changes in the relative supply of college equivalents from 1914 to 1939 for Iowa and for the United States from 1939 States from to 1949 States from , 1949 States from to 1959 States from , and 1959 States from to 1969 from the Census IPUMS samples using the efficiency-units measurement approach of Tables 5 and 6 . 
The relative wage is the log wage differential between those with 12 years and 8 years of school, adjusted for demographic factors. This high school wage premium series is plotted in Figure 1 . The relative supply and demand measures compare exact high school graduates (those with exactly a high school degree or 12 years of completed schooling) to those without a high school diploma (0 to 11 years of schooling). The methodology for constructing the supply and demand measures is the same as described in the notes to Table 1 with high school graduates (H) replacing college equivalents (S) and high school dropouts (O) replacing high school equivalents (U). Thus, the log relative supply measure is given by the log relative wage bill share of high school graduates to dropouts minus the log high school wage premium. The log relative demand measure is based on eq. (4) Sources and Notes: Each column is an OLS regression of the high school wage premium on the indicated variables using a sample covering the years 1914, 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1963 to 2005 . Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. The high school wage premium is the (composition-adjusted) wage differential between those with exactly a high school degree (12 completed years of schooling) and those with 8 completed years of schooling. (High school/dropout) supply is the log supply of those with 12 completed years of schooling to those with 0 to 11 years of schooling measured in efficiency units. 
The "log gap" follows the approach of Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) and is derived as follows. The ratio of unskilled (U) to skilled (S) workers can be decomposed as follows: , where = supply of workers in skill group j in year t, and ( ) = supply of U.S. born (immigrant) workers in skill group j in year t, such that
The first term of the right side of the equation is the native contribution to the ratio. The second term, in brackets, is the immigrant contribution. We call this term the "log gap" and it is given in the table in cols. The "skilled" groups in the table are high school graduates and college "equivalents"; the "unskilled" groups are dropouts and high school "equivalents," respectively. College equivalents are those with 16 or more years of schooling plus half of those with some college. High school equivalents are those with 12 or fewer years of schooling plus half of those with some college. Worker supplies in cols.
(1) to (3) are measured in efficiency units: the sum of hours of work weighted by the relative wage of each individual's demographic group in a base year (the average of 1940, 1960, and 2005) . We use 60 demographic groups (6 education groups by 5 age groups by 2 sexes). The last column presents the immigrant employment share using raw employment counts not efficiency units. Sources: See Table 5 .
Notes: Each cell in the table is the annualized percentage change, from the beginning to the end of the period, of relative skill supplies measured in efficiency units. The total column gives the overall growth in relative skill supply. The immigrant and native-born columns decompose the overall relative skill supply growth into the immigrant and native contributions defined in the notes to Table 5 . The immigrant column can be computed from the data in Table 5 Table 5 for the definitions of college and high-school equivalents and efficiency units. The earnings of wage and salary workers and the self-employed are included in calculating wage bill shares in all years and samples. In those samples for which the earnings for the self-employed are not available (the 1940 Census IPUMS, the CPS MORG samples, and the February 1990 CPS), we impute the hourly earnings of the self-employed using the average earnings of wage and salary workers in the same industry-education-year cell following the approach of Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) . High school dropouts are those with 0 to 11 years of completed schooling. High school graduates are those with exactly 12 years of completed school and no college. College equivalents include all of those with at least a four-year college degree (16 or more years of completed schooling) plus one-half of those with some college.
Educational Wage Differentials:
The log college/high school wage differential is a weighted average of the estimated college (exactly 16 years of completed schooling or bachelor's degree) and post-college (17+ years of schooling or a post-baccalaureate degree) wage premium relative to high school graduates (those with exactly 12 years of completed schooling or a high school diploma) for the year given. The weights are the employment shares of college and post-college workers in 1980.
The log (high school/eighth grade) wage differential is the estimated wage premium for those with exactly a high school degree (12 years of completed schooling) and those with exactly 8 years of completed schooling. Changes in education coding in the census and CPS lead us to include workers with 5 to 8 years of completed schooling in the eighth grade category for the 1990 and 2000 Census, February 1990 CPS, and the 2000 and 2005 CPS MORG samples.
The log (high school/dropout) wage differential is a weighted average of the estimated wage premium for those with exactly a high school degree (12 years of completed schooling) relative to 4 groups of "dropouts," those with exactly 8, 9, 10, and 11 years of completed schooling. The weights are the employment shares in 1980 of dropouts with 8, 9, 10, and 11 years of completed schooling.
Educational wage differentials for the United States for 1940 to 2005 are estimated in each sample using a standard cross-section regression of log hourly earnings on dummies for single years of schooling (or degree attainment) categories (some schooling categories contain multiple years with education coding changes in 1990), a quartic in experience, three region dummies, a part-time dummy, a female dummy, a nonwhite dummy, and interaction terms between the female dummy and quartic in potential experience and the nonwhite dummy. The educational wage differentials are directly taken from the coefficients on the dummy variables for schooling categories. The regression samples include civilian employees from 18 to 65 years old. The regression specification and the specific data processing steps follow the approach of Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998, Estimates of educational wage differentials for Iowa from 1915 to 1940 required a different treatment based on our concerns with the meaning of college education for older cohorts in the 1915 Iowa state census, and difficulties in measuring the returns to education for women in the early twentieth century given the potential importance of unpaid family work. These issues are discussed in detail in Goldin and Katz (2000) .
We use our preferred estimates of the returns to a year of college for young men (18 to 34 years olds) in 1914 and 1939 from Chapter 2, 
